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NOTES & COMMENTS
U.S. V. STEIN: FEDERAL PROSECUTORS TWISTING
THE ARM OF CORPORATE AMERICA WHILE ITS
EMPLOYEES CRY UNCLE (SAM)

I.

INTRODUCTION

"The government ...has let its zeal get in the way of its judgment. It has violated
the Constitution it is sworn to defend."' This is the bold statement of Judge Lewis A.
Kaplan, 2 from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, in
the June 26, 2006, U.S. v. Stein3 opinion. Kaplan delivered a scathing critique of federal
prosecutors' interference with accounting giant KPMG's 4 decision whether to advance

1. U.S. v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Subsequent to the writing of this casenote in
the fall of 2006, the Stein litigation, as well as the federal government's approach to prosecuting corporations,
has seen a tremendous amount of change. Given its inception date, this casenote obviously does not attempt to
summarize or provide an updated commentary on the entire scope and progress of the Stein litigation or the
changes in its wake-which admittedly, have been substantial. Instead, the casenote focuses solely on one
piece of the litigation-now referred to as Stein I-and while "telling the story" of the case in detail, also uses
the decision, in its contextual time frame, as a vehicle to introduce the argument that, given the societal
importance of indemnification and advancement of legal fees (as evidenced in Stein), statutes providing for
such benefits should be consistent for all business entities, regardless of form.
2. President Clinton nominated Judge Kaplan as a federal district court judge in 2004. Kaplan has
presided over several high-profile cases in recent years "including all of the federal litigation involving the
diabetes drug Rezulin; a price-fixing lawsuit against Sotheby's Holdings and Christie's International; and
litigation surrounding the collapse of Parmalat SpA." He is known as being "gruff and sarcastic" and is not
afraid of challenging attorneys' preparedness when they step into his courtroom. One of Kaplan's former law
clerks stated that the judge "pays profound and extraordinary attention to the facts in every case." Kaplan also
has a history of standing up to the government. In a 1997 case involving a Peruvian citizen who had been kept
in custody despite a ruling in his favor by an immigration judge, Kaplan chided prosecutors and the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service for their conduct. Paul Davies, Bench on Fire: KPMG Judge Grills
Prosecutors,Wall St. J. BI (Aug. 5, 2006).
3. 435 F. Supp. 2d 330.
4. KPMG (as it is commonly referred to) is the product of a 1987 merger of the accounting firms Peat
Marwick International (PMI) and Klynveld Main Goerdeler (KMG). The firm provides audit, tax, and
advisory services on a global basis. KPMG International is a Swiss cooperative that provides the network for
its independent member firms from around the world. In 2005, the cooperative included member firms in 144
countries that employed 104,000 people and produced composite revenue of $15.69 billion. KPMG Intl.,
About KPMG, http://www.kpmg.com/About/ (accessed Nov. 3, 2006). KPMG LLP, the entity implicated in
Stein, is a U.S. based limited liability partnership and is a member of the KPMG International network of
independent member firms. The U.S. entity's headquarters is in New York City, New York, and their total
revenues for the 2005 fiscal year ending on September 30, 2005, were approximately $4.7 billion. In 2005,
KPMG LLP employed 19,600 people spread across 93 different U.S. office locations, including approximately
1,600 partners, 13,200 "client service professionals," and 4,800 "client service support" associates. KPMG

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2007

1

TULSA LAW REVIEW
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 43 [2007], Iss. 3, Art. 9

[Vol. 43:739

legal fees to former employees implicated in the largest criminal tax case ever filed.5
According to Kaplan's detailed analysis, KPMG deviated from its routine practice of
paying legal fees 6 to the involved employees because of government pressure on the
company to secure "cooperator" status with prosecutors. 7 "KPMG refused to pay
because the government held the proverbial gun to its head." 8 Kaplan held that but for
the government's coercive methods, the firm would not have abandoned its well9
established track record of paying the legal fees and expenses of its employees.
Faced with the prospect of indictment as an entity for its own role in the criminal
11
tax controversy 1 ° and a similar fate as its old accounting rival Arthur Anderson,
KPMG succumbed to the government's overbearing pressure tactics and effectively left
its employees out in the cold. 12 In the opinion, Kaplan points to the explicit mandatory
13
prosecution guidelines found in a controversial Department of Justice memorandum
and the aggressive tactics of the U.S. attorneys handling the case, as the two primary
sources of government pressure. 14 In essence, a prosecutorial one-two punch that led
Kaplan to respond with a knockout blow of his own in the form of holding the
government's actions unconstitutional. 15 The decision represents the first major judicial
attack on federal prosecution tactics implemented to retaliate against the plethora of
corporate accounting scandals experienced by the American economic sector in recent
years. 16
In a forty-eight page opinion issued in response to a motion submitted by the
KPMG defendants to dismiss their indictments due to government violations of their
constitutional rights, Judge Kaplan directly addresses the nature of indemnification and
advancement of legal fees.17 He refers to indemnification of legal fees as a "principle of
American law" and while "not of constitutional dimension," it is "very much a part of

LLP is commonly referred to as one of the "Big Four" accounting firms in the United States. KPMG LLP,
About KPMG, http://www.us.kpmg.com/about/ (accessed Nov. 3, 2006).
5. Dept. Just., Superseding Indictment of 19 Individuals Filed in KPMG Criminal Tax Fraud Case,
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2005/October/05 tax_547.html (accessed Sept. 10, 2006). According to the
allegations, the tax shelters at the center of the controversy generated a minimum of $11 billion in artificial tax
losses, which allowed for at least $2.5 billion in taxes to be evaded by affluent individuals. Id.
6. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 336; see also Pls. Compl. for Advancement at 23, Stein et al. v. KPMG LLP,
2006 WL 2922089 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2006); John F. Olson et al., Litigation and the Director,Pre-Conference
Briefingfor the 38th Annual Institute on Securities Regulation: CriticalDecisions in the Boardroom: Advising
Your Clients, 1569 PLl/Corp 179, 190 (Nov. 2006).
7. Marvin G. Pickholz & Jason R. Pickholz, InvestigationsPut Employees in Tough Spot, 236 N.Y.L.J. 10,
col. 4 (July 24, 2006).
8. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 336.
9. Id.
10. See id. at 338-50.
11. Id. at 337. As a result of the criminal indictment of their accounting firm, Arthur Anderson's business
collapsed even before their case was tried. Id.
12. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330.
13. The controversial Department of Justice memorandum Judge Kaplan points to as a source of the
prosecution's unconstitutional tactics is Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations,
otherwise known as the "Thompson Memo," which is fully examined in Part II(B) of this casenote.
14. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330.
15. Id.
16. Lynnley Browning, Judge Raises New Concerns about Tactics in Shelter Case, N.Y. Times C3 (July
14,2006).
17. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 335.
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol43/iss3/9
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American life."' 18 He clearly states, "This right is as much a part of the bargain between
employer and employee as salary or wages." 19 Kaplan's succinct description of the
"principle" is this: "[A]n employer often must reimburse an employee for legal expenses
when the employee is sued, or even charged with a crime, as a result of doing his or her
job.",2 0 Regarding the nature of advancement of legal fees, Kaplan's view is that "the
employer often must advance legal expenses to an employee up front, although the
employee sometimes must pay the employer back if the employee has been guilty of
wrongdoing."21
Judge Kaplan evidences his sincere recognition of the "principles" of
indemnification and advancement by fashioning two primary remedies in Stein designed
to restore the defendants "to the position they would have occupied had the government
not interfered improperly with their prospects for advancement of defense costs." 22 This
casenote examines the remedies Kaplan proposes in Stein but primarily focuses on and
supports one remedy in particular. By combining Delaware partnership and corporation
law on indemnification and advancement of legal fees, 23 Kaplan provides the KPMG
defendants with a mechanism known as a "summary advancement proceeding" to seek
their desired legal expenses in an expeditious manner. 24 This casenote applauds
Kaplan's creative use of two different sources of Delaware business entity law to
formulate such a remedy, and closely examines how this remedy was constructed. As a
corollary topic, the casenote will also address the Delaware partnership law governing
KPMG in regards to indemnification, 25 and offer a public policy argument that its
provisions should expressly provide for advancement of legal fees along with an avenue
to resolve conflicts over indemnification similar to that of the Delaware corporation
26
law.
Before an examination of the remedies proffered in Stein can be undertaken, it is
essential to understand the facts and environment preceding the litigation that spawned
the eventual violations of the KPMG employees' constitutional rights and provided cause
for Judge Kaplan to issue such remedies. Accordingly, Part II of the casenote describes
the political context surrounding Stein. This background specifically includes an
examination of the evolution of the Justice Department's formal guidelines for the
prosecution of corporations. Part III articulates the specific factual circumstances of
Stein, employing a predominately sequential approach. Also included in this section is a
restatement of Judge Kaplan's "ultimate factual conclusions ' 2 7 as well as a brief
28
summary of his legal holdings and the reasoning behind them.

18. Id.

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 380.

23. The indemnification statute governing partnerships in Delaware is Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 15-110
(2000). The indemnification statute governing corporations in Delaware is Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 145 (1997).
24. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 379-80.

25. Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 15-110.
26. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 145.
27. See Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 352-53.

28. See id.

Published by at
TU353-73.
Law Digital Commons, 2007

3

TULSA LA W RE VIEW
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 43 [2007], Iss. 3, Art. 9

[Vol. 43:739

Part IV addresses the analytical framework of the above stated thesis by delving
further into the court's proposed remedies, paying special attention and providing
support to the "summary advancement proceeding '2 9 and the inventive creation and
mechanics behind this particular remedy. A brief, general discussion of indemnification
and advancement of legal fees precedes the thesis analysis, providing a necessary
foundation to comprehend the court's approach to remedying the government's violation
of the KPMG employees' constitutional rights. Finally, Part V highlights the issues
brought to the forefront by Stein, the resolution of which will certainly have an impact on
the state of not only the advancement of legal fees, but also on the post-Enron approach
employed by federal prosecutors against American businesses.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Evolution of Justice Department Guidelinesfor CorporateProsecution

Fully understanding the court's criticism of the government's prosecution tactics in
U.S. v. Stein30 requires an analysis of the history of the Department of Justice's
development of guidelines for prosecuting business entities. Preceding the existence of
the Thompson Memorandum 3 1 (the government memo providing the fuel for the Stein
holding) a document entitled Federal Prosecution of Corporations32 established the
initial Department of Justice guidelines addressing the charging of corporations. 33 The
memorandum was drafted by then U.S. Deputy Attomey General Eric Holder 34 in June
1999, and assisted government prosecutors in deciding whether to charge corporations,
rather than individuals, with criminal wrongdoing. 35 Prior to the issuance of the "Holder
Memo," 36 the Justice Department lacked a standardized policy addressing the
37
prosecution of corporations.
In a letter attached to the FederalProsecution of Corporationsand directed to "All
Component Heads and United States Attorneys," Deputy Attorney General Holder made
it expressly clear that the new factors were "not outcome-determinative and [were] only

29. Id. at 379-80.
30. 435 F. Supp. 2d 330.
3 1. Dept. Just., FederalProsecution of Business Organizations,http://www.justice.gov/dag/cftf/corporate
_guidelines.htm (accessed Sept. 10, 2006). This document is commonly referred to as the "Thompson
Memorandum" due to the fact it was drafted by then Deputy Attorney General, Larry D. Thompson. Id.
32. Dept. Just., FederalProsecution of Corporations,http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/policy/charging
corps.html (accessed Sept. 10, 2006).
33. Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World: The
Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice,43 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1095, 1099 (2006).
34. Mr. Holder was appointed in 1997 by President Clinton to the Deputy Attorney General post. The
Deputy Attorney General is the second highest ranking position in the Department of Justice, and Mr. Holder
was the first African-American to serve in that capacity. He also had a brief stint as the Acting Attorney
General during the confirmation process of Attorney General John Ashcroft. Covington & Burling LLP,
Professionals,http://www.cov.com/lawyers/eholder/biography.html (accessed Sept. 10, 2006).
35. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 336.
36. The memorandum FederalProsecution of Corporationsis also known as the "Holder Memo," given
the fact that then Deputy Attorney General Holder was responsible for its drafting. Wray & Hur, supra n. 33,
at 1099.
37. Id.
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol43/iss3/9
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guidelines." 38 He also made it clear that federal prosecutors were under no obligation to
utilize the suggested factors, nor was it necessary to make note of the importance they
attributed to individual factors in determining the culpability of a company in a given
case. 39 Despite the fact that the Holder Memo was only a purely discretionary tool for
prosecutors, the content of the document is one of the primary sources Judge Kaplan
40
relies on in the Stein opinion.
As well as identifying some "common sense considerations" 4 1 in the determination
of whether to formally charge a corporation, the Holder Memo expressly provided one
particular section of factors that eventually formed the foundation of the dispute in
Stein.42 This section was entitled "Charging the Corporation: Cooperation and
Voluntary Disclosure, 'A3 and suggested that part of a government prosecutor's
evaluation should include the consideration of a company's "timely and voluntary
disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its
agents." 44 This analysis of an entity's readiness to cooperate in the investigation could
also factor in, if necessary, a company's "waiver of the corporate attorney-client and
work product privileges.''45 Section VI of the memo described in further detail the
meaning of cooperation as the "willingness to identify the culprits within the corporation,
including senior executives, to make witnesses available, [and] to disclose the complete
results of its internal investigation ....
,46 The section then included several paragraphs
of commentary, one of which contained the precise framework for the primary conflict in
Stein:
Another factor to be weighed by the prosecutor is whether the corporation appears to be
protecting its culpable employees and agents .... [A] corporation's promise of support to
culpable employees and agents, either through the advancing of attorneysfees, through

retaining the employees without sanction for their misconduct, or through providing
information to the employees about the government's investigation pursuant to a joint
defense agreement, may be considered by the prosecutor in weighing the extent and value
47
of a corporation's cooperation.
Central to the principle issue in Stein is the aforementioned statement concerning
the advancement of attorneys fees. 48 A footnote to the legal fees comment did recognize
the fact that some states by statute require corporations to pay the legal costs of officers
(prior to a conviction), which clearly would not render a company being defined as

38.

Dept. Just., supra n. 32.

39. Id.
40. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 336, 352.
41. Id. at 336. Among the "common sense considerations" prosecutors were instructed to take note of were
"the nature and seriousness of the offense, the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the entity, the company's
efforts to remedy past misconduct, the adequacy of other remedies" as well as other similarly related inquiries.
Id.
42. Id.at 337.
43. Dept. Just., supra n. 32, at § VI.
44. Id. at § ll(A)(4).
45. Id.
46. Id. at § VI(A).
47. Id. at § VI(B) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
48. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330.
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uncooperative, since they simply would be adhering to the controlling law of their
respective state. 49 As a result, it is possible to deduce from the text of the Holder Memo
that a company under investigation by the federal government, who does not have a legal
duty to advance fees, could potentially be viewed as not "cooperating" if they engaged in
5
the practice of forwarding fees to a "culpable" employee at their own discretion. 0 This
is the precise understanding and view of the language in the Holder Memo as interpreted
in the context
by Judge Kaplan 5 1 and this logic becomes vitally important when viewed
52
Stein.
in
defendants
the
and
KPMG
between
of the conflict of interests
B.

53
The Inherently Threatening "Thompson Memorandum"

Federal prosecutors' discretion in adhering to the guidelines set forth in the Holder
Memo was briskly terminated when a wave of corporate scandals rocked the nation just
two short years after the memo's issuance. 54 A number of large corporations fell victim
to their own corrupt and fraudulent practices, highlighted by the massive implosion of
energy stalwart Enron in 2001. 55 Also involved in the corporate scandals was Arthur
Anderson, the auditor for Enron and major competitor of KPMG.5 6 Arthur Anderson
was indicted by the federal government for their role in the Enron debacle, and as a result
of the indictment, the firm collapsed prior to the case being tried. 57 The fate of Arthur
Anderson would no doubt cast a dark shadow in KPMG's58 conscience when they too
would face the imminent possibility of a federal indictment.
In 2002, as one part of a reply to the plethora of corporate scandals, 59 President
Bush developed a corporate fraud task force, led by a new Deputy Attorney General,
In the backdrop of the corporate fallout of the previous two
Larry D. Thompson.
years, Thompson and Justice Department officials conducted an analysis of the Holder
Memo and in January 2003 issued a new Department document entitled Principles of
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations,6 1 which was quickly coined the
"Thompson Memo." 62 The Thompson Memo was essentially a slight alteration of the
Holder Memo with many of the provisions actually left unchanged. 63 In particular, the

49. Dept. Just., supra n. 32, at n. 3.
50. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 337.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 330.
53. Id. at 352.
54. Wray & Hur, supra n. 33, at 1100.
55. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 337. Also included in the 2001 corporate collapse were Adelphia
Communications, Global Crossing, HealthSouth, ImClone, Tyco International, and WorldCom, among others.
Id.; Wray & Hur, supra n. 33, at 1100.
56. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 337.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 341.
59. Another federal response to corporate scandal was the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)).
Wray & Hur, supra n. 33, at 1101.
60. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 337.
61. Dept. Just., supra n. 31.
62. Wray & Hur, supra n. 33, at 1101.
63. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 338.
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol43/iss3/9

6

2008]

TWISTING THE ARM OF CORPORATE AMERICA

Bridges: U.S. v. Stein: Federal Prosecutors Twisting the Arm of Corporate

language pertaining to the advancement of legal fees and corporate cooperation remained
identical.64
The influential characteristic of the Thompson Memo that clearly distinguished it
from its precursor was that all federal prosecutors were now obligated to abide by the
tenets of the document when considering the prosecution of a business entity. 65 This
change meant that if a company wished to abide by their long-standing policy of
advancing legal fees to its employees charged with criminal conduct in the course of
their job, federal prosecutors must view this as possible uncooperative action and as a
"factor weighing in favor of the indictment of the entity." 66 Considering the impact of
the indictment on Arthur Anderson, it is clear that under the Thompson Memo it would
be a huge mistake for a company in the government's crosshairs not to cooperate at all
costs with prosecutors, even if that meant abandoning a well-established company
67
practice.
This amplified focus on corporate cooperation with government prosecutors is best
articulated in the introductory portion of the Thompson Memo, which states that "the
main focus of the revisions is increased emphasis on and scrutiny of the authenticity of a
corporation's cooperation." 68 The preface to the revised guidelines directs prosecutors
to determine if a company is truly cooperating with the government, or acting to interfere
with the "quick and effective exposure of the complete scope of wrongdoing." 69 Is it
then a logical conclusion for corporate counsel to assume that the discretionary
advancement of legal fees to "culpable employees" equates to an interference with the
"quick and effective exposure" of a criminal investigation? 70 This is just one of the
issues so delicately framed in Stein, a case that demonstrates the extent to which a
company under federal investigation will go to earn the precious status of "cooperator"
in order to avoid the death knell of a federal indictment. 7 1 Consequently, the actions of
the corporation in cooperating with the Thompson Memo are not without a reaction,
which in Stein is represented by the indicted employees' loss of legal assistance provided
72
by the company.
III.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

KPMG Enters the Government's Radar

During the development of the Thompson Memo, the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) began investigating tax shelters large accounting firms were creating and
marketing to wealthy individuals. 73 Included in this investigation were a number of
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Pickholz & Pickholz, supra n. 7.
Dept. Just., supra n. 31.
Id.
Id.
Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330.
Id.
Laurie P. Cohen, In the Crossfire: Prosecutors' Tough New Tactics Turn Firms against Employees; As
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74
The tax
shelters that allegedly implicated the defendants centrally involved in Stein.
shelters under investigation were intricate transactions designed to mitigate affluent
participants' tax obligations. 75 For example, KPMG advised certain clients to create
shell companies and execute large loans in proceedings that generated significant tax
savings. 76 This practice divided the partners at KPMG, with some believing the firm had
an obligation to register the shelters with the IRS, while others claimed it was not
77
KPMG
necessary for the firm to bring the shelters to the attention of the agency.
ultimately decided not to register the shelters and instead embarked on a course of
actively selling the products. 78 This decision ultimately drew the focus of the IRS
though, and in early 2002, the 79agency issued nine summonses to KPMG related to its
aggressive tax shelter program.
In late 2002, a Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs initiated a general
inquiry into the "development, marketing, and implementation of abusive tax shelters by
accountants, lawyers, financial advisors, and bankers. ' 8° In November 2003, the
investigation led to public hearings where a group of current and former KPMG partners
testified.8 1 KPMG was the focus of much of the senate committee's inquiry, due in part
82
to the firm's strong defense of the shelters it had designed and sold. In the course of
the inquiry, the committee discovered that KPMG had collected approximately $124
million in fees generated from the sale of tax shelters to roughly 350 individuals from
1997 to 2001.83
To lead the defense of KPMG's practices before the Senate committee, the firm
84
turned to Jeffrey Eischeid, a tax partner in charge of personal-financial planning.
While Eischeid was not involved in the development of the shelters, he was responsible
for ushering two of the shelters through the firm's internal approval process and
marketing them. 85 Eischeid's testimony to the committee did not produce the type of
results KPMG desired though. 86 At one critical point in the hearings, Senator Carl
Levin 87 pressured Eischeid to admit that the primary purpose of the shelters was to assist
individuals in the evasion of taxes. 88 When Eischeid disagreed by insisting that the
shelters also had an investment function, Senator Levin responded by reading aloud an
email written by Eischeid describing a particular tax shelter as being "designed to

Sentencing Rules Stiffen, KPMG Axes Tax Partners, Won't Pay Their Legal Costs; What 'Cooperation'
Entails,Wall St. J. Al (June 4, 2004).
74. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 338.
75. Cohen, supra n. 73.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 338.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Cohen, supra n. 73.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Senator Levin was the ranking minority member on the committee. Cohen, supran. 73.
88. Id.
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol43/iss3/9
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mitigate an individual's income tax, as well as estate and gift tax burdens." 89 Struggling
to respond with an appropriate reply in the face of such conflicting testimony, Eischeid
told Senator Levin that he did not know how to "change [his] answer," to which the
90
Senator then suggested "[W]ell, try an honest answer."
B.

Spring Cleaning at KPMG

As a result of the less than stellar showing at the Senate hearings and the initiation
of IRS proceedings, KPMG decided that significant changes were necessary to improve
the firm's future prospects. 91 Their first move was to make major changes pertaining to
the firm's outside counsel. 92 After the Senate hearings, KPMG fired Willkie Farr &
Gallagher LLP, the law firm responsible for assisting them with their unsuccessful
performance in front of the committee. 93 King & Spalding LLP, the law firm
responsible for KPMG's representation before the IRS, was also relieved from their
95
duties. 94 KPMG then retained the law firm of Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom
96
(Skadden) to help the firm develop a new "cooperative approach."
This new approach involved "clean[ing] house," which consisted of three KPMG
partners who participated in the senate hearings (and who are now defendants in Stein)
being asked to leave their jobs with the firm. 97 One of the dismissed employees, Jeffrey
M. Stein, was the "deputy chair and chief operating officer" for the company. 98 Stein
99
had been responsible for managing the "development and approval of the tax shelters."
Due to Stein's position in the firm,
included a three-year, $100,000
understanding that KPMG would
litigation founded on his actions as

the company gave him a "retirement" package, which
per month "consulting agreement," as well as an
provide legal representation of his choice for any
100
an employee.

Another person asked to leave their position was Jeffrey Eisheid, the tax partner
who led the defense of KPMG in the Senate proceedings. 10 1 KPMG initially placed Mr.
Eisheid on administrative leave, however, the firm later sought and obtained his
resignation. 102 Richard H. Smith, Jr., vice chairman of tax services, was the third

89. Id.
90. Id; Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 339.
91. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 339.
92. Cohen, supra n. 73.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Skadden is widely recognized as the top corporate law firm in the United States. This popular
distinction was recently confirmed by CorporateBoard Member magazine, who conducted an extensive survey
of 1,483 directors and 284 general counsel of publicly traded companies. Skadden was placed at the top of
both the directors' and general counsels' lists as the firm they would most want to represent their company on a
national matter. Corp. Bd. Member Mag., Directorsand General Counsel Rank Best Corporate Law Firms in
America, Skadden Arps Tops List for the Fifth Straight Year, http://www.boardmember.com/aboutus/
release_061305.shtml (accessed Oct. 8, 2006).
96. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 338-39.
97. Id. at 339.
98. Id.
99. Cohen, supran. 73.
100. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 339.
101. Cohen, supran. 73.
102. Id.
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10 3
partner forced out of his position with the firm when he was internally reassigned.
After completing the aforementioned personnel changes, KPMG claimed the moves
"reaffirm[ed] KPMG's commitment to the highest standards of professional practice and
04
responsibility."1
In spite of KPMG's self-proclaimed re-dedication to professional ethics, a great
deal of damage had already been inflicted to the firm's image and good standing with the
government. 105 This harm was finally realized when in early 2004, "the IRS made a
6
criminal referral to the Department of Justice ' 1° concerning KPMG's alleged
10 7
The Department of
involvement in the design and marketing of illegal tax shelters.
Southern District
Justice passed the referral to the United States Attorney's Office for the
108
Stein.
in
involved
parties
and
forum
the
both
finalizing
of New York,

C.

"The Meeting"

On February 5, 2004, the U.S. attorney's office contacted Skadden regarding the
criminal referral from the Internal Revenue Service and scheduled an initial meeting for
February 25, 2004.109 As part of the U.S. attorneys' preparation for the meeting, they
drafted a document called "Skadden Meeting Points," articulating specific issues they
wanted to pursue.1 10 On the first page was an item that posed the questions: "Is KPMG
paying/going to pay the legal fees of employees? Current or former? Any agreements or
This specific reference to an initial
other obligations to do so? What are they?"'
inquiry concerning the payment of legal fees provides one overt example of the
government's significant interest in the topic.112
At the meeting on February 25, 2004, the lead attorney representing Skadden was
Robert S. Bennett. 113 Bennett is a high-profile trial lawyer who has been involved in the
114
He also represented President
corporate defense of both Enron and HealthSouth.
115
CIA leak investigation.
recent
the
in
Miller
Judith
and
case
Jones
Paula
the
in
Clinton
Eugene O'Kelly,
Bennett's services were specifically sought out by then KPMG chair,
116
partners.
firm's
the
involving
hearings
after the unfavorable senate
Bennett had developed a stellar reputation as cooperatively working with federal

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 339.
106. Id.
107. Dept. Just., supra n. 5.
108. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 339.
109. Id.at 340-41.
110. Id. at 341.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 341.
114. Cohen, supra n. 73.
115. Mr. Bennett is a former federal prosecutor and is also the co-leader of the firm's "international
Government Enforcement Litigation group" as well as its "Criminal and Civil Litigation practice" at their
Washington, D.C. office. He was selected in 2006 by the National Law Journal as "one of the '100 Most
Influential Lawyers in America."' Skadden, Biography, Robert S. Bennett, http://www.skadden.com/index
.cfm?contentlD=45&biolD=1000 (accessed Sept. 10, 2006).
116. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 339.
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol43/iss3/9
10

2008]

TWISTING THE ARM OF CORPORATE AMERICA

Bridges: U.S. v. Stein: Federal Prosecutors Twisting the Arm of Corporate

prosecutors in corporate defense cases. 1 17 During Bennett's defense work on the
HealthSouth case, the U.S. attorney in Birmingham said she "found him a pleasure to
work with." 118 This adulation possibly resulted from Bennett's quick work there "to
make documents and witnesses available to prosecutors." 119 He also is very aware of
the effects that an indictment can have on a company's future, as evidenced by his
comment that an indictment of HealthSouth "would risk putting 40,000 people out of
work." 120 Clearly, KPMG had found the attorney who could understand their
predicament and the potentially devastating consequences should the firm suffer an
indictment as an entity for criminal wrongdoing.
Headlining the government's representation at the meeting was the chief counsel to
the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Shirah Neiman. 12 1 Neiman
was a contributor to the Holder Memo and was the U.S. attorney's office liaison to the
Internal Revenue Service. 12 2 She also was the supervising attorney handling the
criminal referral initiated by the IRS involving KPMG. 123 Both sides were represented
by additional counsel, including Assistant U.S. Attorney Weddle, who started the
meeting by telling Skadden the government was interested in hearing their comments
' 124
and had a few follow-up questions as well."
Bennett informed the government of KPMG's self-initiated decision to "clean
house" and "change the atmosphere at the firm." 12 5 He also mentioned that KPMG was
willing to fully cooperate with the government's inquiry, and in a clear reference to
Arthur Anderson's collapse, stated that the goal was to "save KPMG" and not to shield
any individual employees. 126 After some other preliminary conversation between the
two sides, Weddle brought up the topic of legal fees and inquired as to whether KPMG
had any duty to pay the fees of its employees. 127 In an effort to "test the waters,"
Bennett asked for the government's take on the subject. 128 Neiman fielded the question
and informed Skadden that the government would take into consideration any legal
obligations to pay fees, but specifically referenced the Thompson Memo as "a point that
129
had to be considered.'
In response, Skadden explained KPMG's "common practice" in the past had been
to take care of legal expenses for employees. 130 Skadden further stated that KPMG's
partnership agreement was unclear on the topic and that the controlling Delaware

117. Cohen, supra n. 73.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 340.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 341.
125. Id.
126. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 341.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
atby342.
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statute 131 allowed the company to do as it pleased, however, they were still fully
analyzing the firm's legal duties. 132 Then, in an obvious ploy to favorably position itself
with the government's prosecution objectives, Skadden announced that KPMG would no
or
longer pay the legal fees of employees who refused to cooperate with the government
133
self-incrimination.
against
right
constitutional
Amendment
who invoked their Fifth
Both sides then momentarily moved on to discussing other topics, but Weddle
quickly circled back around to the fees issue and once again asked Bennett to ascertain
KPMG's duties relating to the matter. 134 Immediately after this inquiry regarding
payment of legal fees by Weddle, Neiman stated that, "misconduct should not or cannot
Given the context
be rewarded" and then mentioned "federal guidelines." 135
surrounding this comment by Neiman, it is easy to understand how the court in Stein
found that it was reasonable for both Skadden and the prosecutors to understand her
statement as a not so subtle "reminder."' 136 A "reminder" that if a company advances
legal fees to an employee under investigation, where they have no legal obligation to do
so, under the Thompson Memo the action would be viewed as "uncooperative" thus
137
subjecting the company to a potential indictment.
Just in case the true meaning of the remark from Neiman was not clear enough
though, Weddle followed up her comment by telling Skadden that "if you have
discretion re[garding] fees, we'll look at that under a microscope." ' 138 While Neiman
would later argue to the court that she was not referring to the legal fee issue with her
"reward" comment, 139 Weddle's unambiguous message certainly provides contradictory
evidence to her claim. 140 As a result of Neiman's comment and the follow-up statement
by Weddle, Judge Kaplan concluded in Stein that while the U.S. attorneys handling the
case did not explicitly tell Skadden that KPMG should refrain from paying the legal fees
of its employees, no party present at the meeting could have understood the
14 1
government's message as communicating anything to the contrary.
D.

KPMG's (Successful) Quest to Satisfy the Government's Definition of Cooperation

After Skadden's meeting with the U.S. attorneys on February 25, 2004, KPMG
(aided by the counsel of Skadden) began a series of maneuvers designed to satisfy the

131. Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 15-110.
132. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 342.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 344.
137. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 343-44.
138. Id. at 344. Mr. Weddle's statement was recorded by Mr. Pilchen, an attorney for Skadden. Although
the comment by Mr. Weddle only appeared in Mr. Pilchen's notes of the meeting and no person present at the
meeting could recall the comment being said, the court upheld the evidential integrity of the quote. The court
emphasized the fact that Mr. Pilchen's notes specifically attributed the comment to Mr. Weddle, that
"memorable language" was used, and that the remark was clearly underlined in Mr. Pilchen's notes. Id. at 344
n. 52.
139. Id. at 342.
140. Id.at 344.
141. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 344.
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol43/iss3/9
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government's definition of cooperation as laid out in the Thompson Memo 142 and in the
firm's subjective perceptions of the federal prosecutors' expectations. 143 The first
example of cooperative behavior was Bennett's follow-up with Weddle regarding the
legal fee question. 144 He informed Weddle that they did not believe KPMG had any
legal obligation to pay fees, but since the firm was a partnership, "it would be a big
problem" to not pay them. 14 5 Bennett mentioned that KPMG was thinking about still
paying fees, but conditioning the receipt of such fees on a partner or employee
"cooperating fully with the company and the government," and also putting a "cap" or
14 6
The U.S. attorneys
"limit" on the total amount of fees the company would pay.
accepted KPMG's legal conclusion and plans on the fee issue without looking into the
14 7
situation further.
On March 11, 2004, Skadden forwarded a letter to prosecutors they were preparing
to send out to all KPMG employees who were suspected of being involved in the
148
In the letter, Skadden detailed
government's criminal investigation of the firm.
149
The policy stated
KPMG's new policy pertaining to the advancement of legal fees.
that KPMG would pay an employee's legal fees up to $400,000, conditioned on that
individual cooperating with the government and being "prompt, complete, and
truthful." 150 It also mentioned that the payment of fees would "cease immediately" if
15 1
After
the employee is "charged by the government with criminal wrongdoing."
fees, the
learning of KPMG's newly implemented policy on the advancement of legal
152
guidelines.
"self-imposed"
firm's
the
with
objections
no
had
U.S. attorneys
Prosecutors did take issue though, with an "advisory memorandum" that Joseph
Loonan, then KPMG deputy general counsel, sent to firm employees addressing
"potential contacts by the government." 153 While the memo suggested employees fully
cooperate with the government investigation, it also mentioned that employees had a
right to an attorney in their interaction with prosecutors, the benefits associated with

142. Dept. Just., supra n. 31, at § VI.
143. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 344-47.
144. Id. at 344.
145. Id. at 344-45.
146. Id. at 345.
147. Id. at 344-45 n. 54. This failure by the prosecutors to not probe further into KPMG's legal duty to
provide fees deeply troubled the court. Judge Kaplan's view was that the firm had a strong interest in
concluding they did not have a legal obligation to pay fees so they could avoid any possible conflict with the
related provisions of the Thompson Memo or with the prosecutors' already clear message on the subject. The
court felt that the prosecutors should have been aware of this blatant conflict between KPMG's interests and its
employees' interests, and looked into the matter firsthand to make an unbiased determination on the subject.
Instead, all the prosecutors did was request a copy of KPMG's partnership agreement and by-laws which they
may or may not have actually read. The government also did not question the practice of Skadden
recommending as counsel to KPMG employees "law firms that were familiar with these types of proceedings
and who understood that cooperation with the government was the best way to proceed." Judge Kaplan
comments that "while cooperation with government prosecutors may have been the best way for KPMG to
proceed... it was not necessarily best for its employees." Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 344-45 n. 54.
148. Id. at 345.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 345-46.
152. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 346.
153. Id.
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representation by counsel, and that KPMG would be providing "independent counsel"
for those who were interested. 154
The prosecutors were "upset" about the
memorandum's content and promptly told Skadden they were "disappointed with [its]
tone" and "one-sided presentation of potential issues" and insisted that KPMG reissue a
155
new memorandum including revisions suggested by the prosecutors.
The only difference between the revised memorandum suggested by the
government and the original memorandum drafted by Loonan, was that the government
wanted the document to explicitly mention that KPMG employees had the option to
"meet with investigators without the assistance of counsel. '' 156 At first, Bennett
challenged the government's demand to change the memorandum, pointing to past
examples where he had sent out documents very similar to the one Loonan had drafted
without objection by prosecutors. 157 Bennett also re-emphasized to the government the
extreme change KPMG had implemented in its policy addressing the payment of legal
fees. 158 In the end, however, KPMG succumbed to the government pressure to
cooperate and subsequently issued a revised memorandum to employees with the
prosecutors' suggested alterations. 159 According to the court in Stein, the government's
motive in insisting on the revision to the employee memorandum was to improve the
odds that KPMG employees would consent to government meetings absent consultation
160
with an attorney either before or during an interview.
In yet another obvious ploy to display KPMG's willingness to cooperate with the
government, the firm asked the U.S. attorneys to "notify [them] if any current or former
161
KPMG employee refused to meet with prosecutors or otherwise failed to cooperate."'
The prosecutors handling the investigation seized this invitation from KPMG and
frequently brought to Skadden's attention examples of KPMG employees refusing to
conform to government demands. 162 Skadden responded to these "tips" by contacting
the lawyer for the employee in question and informing them that "absent an indication
from the government within the next ten business days that your client no longer refuses
to participate in an interview with the government," the payment of the employee's legal
fees and expenses would be canceled. 163 This heavy-handed approach ultimately
resulted in some KPMG employees submitting to the "pressure of the threats" and realigning their efforts in the investigation to the government's standards. 164 Other KPMG
employees, however, exhibited a more defiant stance under the circumstances and were
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 346 n. 66.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 346. KPMG ultimately sent out a new memorandum to employees in a "Q & A format" that
provided a "more balanced approach" according to Mr. Bennett. The "question" on the revised memorandum
to employees that satisfied the government's concerns was "Do I have to be assisted by a lawyer?" This
question was then answered with a response of "No," and that the employees could "deal directly with
government representatives without counsel." Id. at 346 n. 66.
160. Id. at 347.
161. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 347.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol43/iss3/9
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by having their employment terminated and the
promptly rewarded for their actions 165
cancelled.
fees
legal
their
of
payment
One final illuminating example of KPMG's unwavering cooperation with the
government was the firm's response to what the court referred to as the "Stein
problem."' 166 The Stein problem referred to two sources of conflict associated with the
large "retirement" package KPMG extended to its former "deputy chair and chief
operating officer," Jeffrey M. Stein. 167 The first source of conflict was the head of the
criminal division of the U.S. Attorney's Office, Karen Seymour, disclosing to KPMG
that she was aware that the firm had "granted rich severance packages to certain
executives." 168 Seymour stated that the practice introduced a "troubling issue under the
Thompson Memo." 169 In an effort to sidestep this point, Skadden reminded the
government of their new policy on legal fees, which included capping the payment17of
0
fees at $400,000 and conditioning receipt of fees on full cooperation with prosecutors.
Skadden's attempt to mitigate the excessive nature of Stein's severance package by
mentioning the cap placed on the payment of legal fees actually created the second
source of conflict concerning KPMG's retirement deal with Stein. 171 That conflict was
the fact that KPMG had already paid over $646,000 in legal fees on Stein's behalf, which
was an obvious violation of the standards the firm had set to garner "cooperator" status
172
with the government and increase their chances of escaping indictment as an entity.
After David N. Kelley, then U.S. Attorney, told Skadden that in regards to KPMG's
cooperation efforts he had "seen a lot better from big companies," KPMG decided that
the "Stein situation" was too flammable to ignore and decided to take action on the
matter. 173 Eight days before KPMG was scheduled to meet with the U.S. Deputy
Attorney General to discuss their case, the firm terminated both the consulting segment
of Stein's package and the payment of his legal fees. 174 According to Loonan, KPMG's
deputy general counsel, the175firm took these steps "because [we] thought it would help
[us] with the government."'
On June 13, 2005, Skadden and KPMG met with then Deputy Attorney General
James Comey to make their case against indicting the accounting firm for criminal
conduct associated with the allegedly illegal tax shelters. 176 Leading the way at the
meeting for KPMG was Bennett, whose argument to Comey heavily relied on the drastic
measures KPMG had taken in order to meet the government's expectations of

165. Id.
166. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 347.
167. Id. at 339, 347-48.
168. Id. at 347.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 347-48.
172. Id. at 348 n. 74.
173. Id. at 348.
174. Id.
175. Id. Loonan further stated that "wanting to have the government believe we were cooperating with them
was one of the reasons" the company sent a letter to Stein notifying him of KPMG's decision to cease paying
his legal expenses. Justice in the Dock, Wall St. J. A14 (June 6, 2006).
176. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 348.
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cooperation. 177 Bennett specifically mentioned that KPMG had done something "really
precedent-setting" by "condition[ing] the payment of attorney's fees on full cooperation
with the investigation."' 1 78 Bennett also informed Comey of the corrective "action"
KPMG took when federal prosecutors informed the firm of employees who were failing
to cooperate in the government's investigation. 1 79 In Bennett's estimation, the steps
' 180
taken by KPMG evidenced "a level of cooperation that is rarely done."
KPMG's efforts to comply with federal prosecutors at all costs finally resulted in a
successful outcome for the firm when on August 29, 2005, they entered into a "deferred
prosecution agreement" with the government. 18 1 As part of the "agreement to defer
prosecution," KPMG consented to a multitude of government conditions. 182 First,
KPMG had to admit to extensive criminal activity, which included their role in the
"largest criminal tax case ever filed.'183 Specifically, KPMG admitted to engaging in a
fraud that produced approximately $11 billion in artificial tax losses and cost the U.S.
184
government roughly $2.5 billion in "evaded taxes."
KPMG also agreed to pay the government a whopping total of $456 million in
"fines, restitution, and penalties" as part of the deal. 185 This included a payment of $100
million in "civil fines" for not registering the tax shelters with the government. 186 A
sum of $128 million in "criminal fines" which accounted for the "disgorgement of fees"
KPMG collected on the tax shelters. 187 Also part of the total penalty was $228 million
in "criminal restitution" for lost taxes caused by KPMG's obstinacy in submitting
188
relative files and records to the IRS, which allowed the statute of limitations to expire.
The deferred prosecution agreement also required "permanent restrictions on
KPMG's tax practice." 189 These restrictions called for the complete elimination of two
practice areas, the most fitting of which was the removal of the KPMG group that
exclusively provided services to affluent individuals.19° Additionally, the agreement
banned KPMG from selling any "pre-packaged tax products" and limited the firm's
ability to accept "fees not based on hourly rates." 19 1 The terms of the deal also called for
KPMG to execute and sustain an "effective compliance and ethics program" and to
employ an "independent, government-appointed monitor, ' 192 who will supervise the

177. Id. at 348-49.
178. Id. at 349.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 349; Dept. Just., KPMG to Pay $456 Million for Criminal Violations in
Relation to Largest-Ever Tax Shelter FraudCase, http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/August/05 ag_433.html
(accessed Nov. 5, 2006).
182. Dept. Just., supra n. 181.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Dept. Just.,supran.181.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. The monitor appointed by the government was former Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
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company's adherence to the conditions of the deferred prosecution agreement for a three19 3
year time span.
The condition levied by the government most pertinent to the KPMG employees
involved in the current litigation though, 1 94 is what U.S. Attorney General Alberto R.
Gonzalez termed in a Department of Justice press release as KPMG's "guarantee of
cooperation." 195 In fact, KPMG was required in the agreement with the government to
"acknowledge and understand" that the firm's cooperation in the ongoing criminal
inquiry was a critical reason prosecutors even decided to enter into the deal. 1 96 KPMG's
specific responsibilities related to "cooperation" included disclosing to prosecutors any
information pursuant to government demands, promptly submitting any "documents,
records, information, and other evidence," not asserting any claim of attorney-client or
work product privilege connected to a government request, and making accessible (to97the
best of their ability) any current or ex-employees for interviews or sworn testimony. 1
KPMG further agreed that its duty to cooperate would continue after they fulfilled
the conditions of the deferred prosecution agreement and the government dismissed the
related criminal information. 19 8 Part of this prolonged duty to cooperate consists of
KPMG assisting the government in any "investigation, criminal prosecution or civil
proceeding" related to the fraudulent tax shelter activities of the company or any of its
current or former employees. 199 As long as KPMG fully complies with all of the
conditions set forth in the agreement though, the government will forgo prosecuting the
company for its fraudulent actions associated with the tax shelters. 200 According to
KPMG stands to avoid a criminal conviction if it
Judge Kaplan in Stein, "in a nutshell,
'2 ° 1
lives up to its part of the bargain.
If KPMG fails to adhere to the conditions in the agreement, however, they will be
exposed to the threat of the government claiming the deal was violated and then
"prosecut[ing] the criminal information to verdict." 2° 2 Another viewpoint on the
potential violation of the agreement is that if the government regards any KPMG actions
as not being "cooperative," the result will most assuredly result in a criminal conviction,

Commission, Richard Breeden. Upon expiration of Breeden's duties in this role, "the IRS will monitor
KPMG's tax practice and adherence to elevated standards for two years." One additional action the
government might take should KPMG violate the deferred prosecution agreement is extending the "period of
deferral and/or the monitorship." Dept. Just., supran. 181.
193. Id.
194. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330.
195. Dept. Just., supra n. 181.
196. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 349.
197. Id.
at 350.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Dept. Just., supra n. 181. Technically, as long as KPMG has satisfied the conditions set forth in the
deferred prosecution agreement as of December 31, 2006 (the expiration of the deferral period) the government
will dismiss the criminal information. In reality, however, the continuing cooperation duty imposed on the firm
effectively prolongs KPMG's responsibility to assist the government in any factually related litigation
associated with the tax shelters. This extended duty in theory makes it possible for KPMG to still be charged
with criminal wrongdoing after the deferral period, should they not meet the government's cooperation
standards associated with any connected investigation or litigation. Id.; Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 350.
201. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 349.
202. Id. at 350.
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due to the admissions that the firm has made in order to secure the deferred prosecution
agreement. 20 3 At approximately the same time KPMG and the government entered into
the agreement to defer prosecution, federal prosecutors filed the first criminal
indictments associated with Stein implicating individual KPMG employees in the alleged
tax shelter fraud.204 Adhering to the new company policy implemented to secure
"cooperator" status with the government, KPMG responded to the indictments by
promptly terminating the payment of legal fees and expenses to the accused
individuals.205
When considering the effects a breach of the deferred prosecution agreement
would have on KPMG, 206 it is very easy to understand why it would have spelled certain
annihilation of KPMG as an entity if they would have ignored their new termination of
legal fees policy and continued to pay the legal expenses of the now ex-employee
criminal defendants in Stein.2° 7 KPMG was essentially placed in the unenviable position
of having to choose between the probable extinction of their business, or sacrificing their
20 8
own partners and employees whom the government had already labeled as culpable.
KPMG's decision on the matter, influenced by heavy consideration of the Thompson
Memo and the U.S. attorney's position on the question, is what brings us to the present
2 °9
litigation in Stein.
E.

The Motion to Dismiss and the Court's "Ultimate Factual[and Legal]
2 10
Conclusions"

On January 19, 2006, the former KPMG employees, now defendants in Stein, filed
a motion to dismiss the indictment or for alternate relief2 11 "on the ground that the
government had interfered improperly with the advancement of attorney's fees by
KPMG in violation of their constitutional and other rights." 2 12 In response to the
defendant's motion, the government took an aggressive stance on the issue, claiming that
KPMG had analyzed their legal obligations to advance fees and "decided of its own
2 13
volition" that it would condition payment of such fees on certain specified terms.

203. Id.
204. Id.; Lawrence J. Zweifach & Zachary S. Taylor, United States v. Stein and the Advancement of
Attorney's Fees: The Thompson Memorandum Under a Microscope, 1557 PLI/Corp 903, 909 (Sept. 2006); see
also Dept. Just., supra n. 5 (detailing the charges against the defendants as "conspiracy to defraud the IRS, tax
evasion and obstruction of the Internal Revenue Laws arising out of illegal tax shelters that Big 4-accounting
firm KPMG and others designed, marketed and implemented").
205. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 350.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. As mentioned in the opening paragraph of this casenote, Judge Kaplan described the situation as
"KPMG refus[ing] to pay because the government held the proverbial gun to its head." Id. at 336.
209. Id. at 330.
210. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 352.
211. The KPMG defendants filed their motion for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b). In
addition to praying for the dismissal of their indictments, the defendants also sought alternate relief in the form
of "directing the government to pay the defendants' attorney's fees from the settlement with KPMG" and/or
"an injunction preventing the government from using the Thompson Memorandum to affect corporations'
policies regarding the advancement of fees." Zweifach & Taylor, supran. 204, at 909.
212. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 350.
213. Id.
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol43/iss3/9
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Prosecutors further claimed that the defendants could not point to any specific proof that
would substantiate their claim that the government had "coerced" or "bullied" KPMG
2 14
into adopting the revised policy on payment of legal fees.
In a hearing addressing the motion on March 30, 2006, prosecutors employed for
the first time the posture that it had "no objection whatsoever to KPMG exercising its
free and independent business judgment as to whether to advance defense costs. ' 2 15 The
government assured the court that if KPMG were to decide to advance fees to the
defendants, the decision would not affect in any way KPMG's status under the deferred
prosecution agreement. 2 16 Despite these assurances from prosecutors, the court
"expressed concern" as to whether the Thompson Memo had indeed influenced KPMG's
decision to alter their legal fee payment policy.2 17 Consistent with this concern, the
court subsequently instructed the defendants to submit in writing the exact issues in
2 18
question that would support an evidentiary hearing on the matter.
Federal prosecutors strongly opposed an evidentiary hearing, however, and
responded by filing a brief with the court to combat the defendant's submission
supporting a hearing. 2 19 The government's argument against a hearing primarily relied
on the assertion that "the United States Attorney's Office did not instruct KPMG whether
KPMG should pay legal fees, whether KPMG should cap the payment of legal fees, or
whether KPMG should condition the payment of legal fees." 220
Apparently
unconvinced by the government's conclusory brief, the court decided that an evidentiary
hearing was appropriate under the circumstances, and from May 8-10, 2006, conducted
the hearing. 22 1 The court narrowed the scope of the proceeding to the sole issue of
"whether the government, through the Thompson [Memo] or otherwise, affected
KPMG's determination(s) with respect to the advancement of legal fees and other
defense costs to present or former partners222and employees" involved in the "investigation
and prosecution" of the current litigation.
After considering testimony from prosecutors and KPMG attorneys 2 23 along with
arguments from all involved parties pertaining to the legal fee issue, the court arrived at
four "ultimate factual conclusions" stemming from the evidentiary hearing. 224 The first
three factual findings Judge Kaplan articulated 225 provided the building blocks for the

214. Id.
215. Id. at 351.
216. Id.
217. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 351.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 352.
221. Id.
222. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 352; Lynnley Browning, Prosecutor Says KPMG Move Held No Sway, N.Y.
Times C 13 (May 10, 2006) (stating that Judge Kaplan "called a hearing to determine whether prosecutors acted
improperly" in regards to the fee issue).
223. Browning, supra n. 222.
224. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 352.
225. The first conclusion of fact was that "the Thompson [Memo] caused KPMG to consider departing from
its long-standing policy of paying legal fees and expenses of its personnel in all cases and investigations even
before it first met with the [federal prosecutors]." The second finding of fact was that "the [federal
prosecutors] did not give KPMG the comfort it sought" but rather "consistent with DOJ policy, reinforced the
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fourth conclusion, which served as the court's ultimate determination concerning the
legal fee debacle. 226 In a clearly written summation of the issue, Kaplan held that:
KPMG's decision to cut off all payments of legal fees and expenses to anyone who was
indicted and to limit and to condition such payments prior to indictment upon cooperation
with the government was the direct consequence of the pressure applied by the Thompson
[Memo] and the [federal prosecutors]. Absent the Thompson [Memo] and the actions of
the [federal prosecutors], KPMG would have paid the legal fees and expenses of227all of its
partners and employees both prior to and after indictment, without regard to cost.
By squarely placing the blame on the government for KPMG's abandonment of its longstanding indemnification and advancement practices, 228 Judge Kaplan developed the
factual ammunition needed for an extremely detailed legal analysis of how the
government actions violated the constitutional rights of the individual KPMG
22 9
defendants.
Because this casenote's primary focus is on the remedies the court provides the
violated defendants, only a brief assessment of Judge Kaplan's legal findings will be
tendered in light of his exceptionally thorough legal discussion that spans approximately
twenty pages in the Stein opinion. 2 3 Kaplan began his legal analysis by establishing
that "[t]he Supreme Court long has protected a defendant's right to fairness in the
criminal process." 2 31 He subsequently found that the right to fairness in criminal
proceedings was a "fundamental liberty interest" deserving substantive protection under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 2 32 According
to Supreme Court jurisprudence then, any fundamental right so vital to personal liberty
"cannot be infringed by the government unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest." 2 33 This constitutionally interpreted standard is widely
234
referred to as the "strict scrutiny test."
Kaplan found that the specific infringement by the government requiring strict
scrutiny application was the language in the Thompson Memo concerning the payment
of legal fees along with the prosecutors' behavior during the investigation, which had
pressured KPMG to terminate payment of the defendants' legal expenses. 235 This
interference affected the ability of the former employees to "obtain resources they
otherwise would have had" which in turn prevented them from advancing the defense of
their choice. 23 6 The court found this to be a major obstruction given the complexity and

threat inherent in the Thompson [Memo]." The third factual conclusion was that "the government conducted
itself in a manner that evidenced a desire to minimize the involvement of defense attorneys." Id. at 352-53.
226. Id. at 353.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 340.
229. See Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 353-73.
230. The legal "discussion" section of the Stein opinion begins on page 353 of the opinion and ends on page
373.
231. Id. at 357.
232. Id. at 360; U.S. Const. amend. V.
233. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 360 (citing Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)).
234. Id. at 362.
235. Id.
236. Id.
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cost associated with the defendants237mounting an adequate defense in the "largest tax
fraud case in United States history."
Judge Kaplan then explained that the government actions were not narrowly
tailored because they did not exclusively apply to situations where a company was
advancing fees in an effort to "[circle] the wagons" and obstruct a government
inquiry. 2 38 Instead, the government actions also applied to circumstances where a
company was fully cooperating with a federal investigation but was also advancing fees
to implicated employees under perfectly valid state indemnification statutes. 239 Statutes
that states had purposely enacted as a policy decision to protect the "legitimate public
interests" inherent in indemnification and advancement practices. 24 For these reasons,
Kaplan expressly held that both the "legal fee advancement provision" of the Thompson
24 1
Memo and the prosecutors' conduct in the case violated the Due Process Clause.
In the second part of the court's legal discussion, Kaplan found that the
"Thompson [Memo] and its implementation by the government" violated the defendants'
right to counsel and right to "mount the defense" of their choosing as protected by the
Sixth Amendment. 242 The government knowingly executed its actions with the goal of
restricting the defendants' access to legally available resources that would support their
"constitutional rights to defend themselves." 24 3 Unless the government provided a
sufficient justification for their conduct, the actions stood as blatant violations of the
Sixth Amendment. 244 The court held that any law enforcement interest the government
claimed in interfering with the defendants' rights was clearly outweighed by the need to
ensure the "proper functioning of the adversary process" chosen by the constitution to
decide the outcome of criminal cases. 24 5 Consequently, Kaplan declared the government
actions unjustified and reiterated the importance of the defendants' Sixth Amendment
right to "defend themselves" with lawfully accessible funds in an enormously intricate
and costly criminal trial.246
IV.

A.

ANALYSIS

First,a Primer on Indemnificationand Advancement ofLegal Fees

Indemnification is simply a method for companies to "reimburse its officers,
directors, and employees for personal losses they suffer as a result of the proper exercise

237. Id. As an example of the complexity and cost of this case, at the time this opinion was written, the
government had already generated through discovery approximately 5 million to 6 million pages of material in
addition to "335 depositions and 195 income tax returns." Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 362.
238. Id. at 363-65.
239. Id. at 364.
240. Id.
241. Id. at365.
242. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 365-66; U.S. Const. amend. VI.
243. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 366-68.
244. Id. at 367.
245. Id.at 368-69.
at 369.
246. Id.by
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of their official responsibilities." 24 7 It is a widely accepted legal concept as evidenced
by the fact that all fifty states plus the District of Columbia have enacted statutes
providing for its application. 24 8 Support for indemnification is generally based on two
main policy assertions. 24 9 First, it persuades competent people to pursue corporate
service positions since they know their personal assets will not be at risk for actions they
take on the company's behalf.250 Second, indemnification promotes aggressive risktaking for the company's benefit due to the employees' knowledge that he will not be
25 1
held personally liable if his decisions do not result in a successful outcome.
252
Indemnification statutes come in two forms, mandatory and permissive.
Employers are typically responsible for mandatory indemnification when an employee
covered by an indemnification statute "succeeds on the merits of the case and defeats
liability. ' 2 53 Permissive indemnification refers to the situation where an employee is not
"successful on the merits or otherwise" and instead, the company has discretion whether
or not to indemnify the employee for their legal expenses. 2 54 In these circumstances, the
company's charter, bylaws, partnership agreement, or individual contract is consulted to
determine if the employee has a right to indemnification. 2 55 If the right to
indemnification is not clearly expressed in any of the previous sources, the company may
256
still provide for indemnification on a "case-by-case basis."
Advancement of legal fees is an "especially important corollary to
indemnification" as a technique in persuading talented people to accept corporate
positions. 257 Advancement affords employees "immediate interim relief from the
personal out-of-pocket financial burden of paying the significant on-going expenses
inevitably involved with investigations and legal proceedings." 258 The majority of state
statutes on advancement are permissive; however, a company can elect to render the
advancement of legal fees mandatory by specifying as such in their "certificate of
incorporation or bylaws, or by contract." 25 9 Most large companies today, in an effort to
attract the best talent, routinely provide for mandatory advancement with hardly any
260
conditions or stipulations on the entitlement.
At the same time, most state statutes directly limit a company's ability to advance
247. John K. Villa, Corporate Counsel Guidelines: Overseeing Corporate Criminal Investigations and
Litigation § 5:8[E] (West 2006).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Olson et al., supra n. 6, at 187.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. A company's ability to provide for indemnification through its bylaws or other company documents
in situations not dictated by state statute can also be viewed as creating a "mandatory" right of indemnification
for an employee. Considering that it is at the company's discretion to enact such provisions though, it is also
logical to label such practices as "permissive." Id.
256. Villa, supra n. 247, at § 5:8[E].
257. Homestore,Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 211 (Del. 2005).
258. Id.
259. Olson et al., supra n. 6, at 188.
260. Peter B. Ladig, Thompson Memo Collides with Del. Advancement Law, 21 Andrews Del. Corp. Litig.
Rep. 2 (Nov. 6, 2006).
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legal fees to certain specified circumstances. 26 1 One example of such a limitation is in
Delaware, where a director or officer seeking advancement must first submit a "promise
[or] 'undertaking' to repay the funds if the corporation ultimately establishes that he is
not entitled to indemnification." 262 Once an employee has satisfied any applicable
statutory requirements and is entitled to advancement under a company's provisions, it is
"extremely difficult for [the company] to avoid completely fulfilling its obligation to
advance fees" under the majority of state statutes. 263 Due to strong public policy
favoring advancement, courts generally will not allow a company with ambiguous
advancement terms to "impose litigation-driven, after-the-fact conditions on what is
264
otherwise an unconditional right to advancement."
B.

CorporationLaw + PartnershipLaw = A Remedy for the Defendants

Under Supreme Court jurisprudence, remedies for violations of constitutional
rights "should be tailored to the injury suffered" and "should not unnecessarily infringe
265
on competing interests" such as the "interest in the administration of criminal justice."
The court's theory has been to "identify and then neutralize the taint by tailoring relief
appropriate in the circumstances to assure the defendant the effective assistance of
counsel and a fair trial. ' 266 Applying this judicious approach, Judge Kaplan fashioned
two primary remedies in Stein designed to restore the defendants "to the position they
would have occupied had the government not interfered improperly with their prospects
for advancement of defense costs." 26 7 This "position" could be satisfied if "defense
268
costs already incurred and yet to be incurred [by the defendants] are paid.",
One remedy proffered by Kaplan was for KPMG, on its own initiative or at federal
prosecutors' insistence, to advance to defendants the legal costs associated with the
litigation. 269 Because the government was held responsible for the constitutional
violations in Stein, Kaplan believed prosecutors should "seek to remedy the problem it
has created. ' 27° For example, prosecutors could exercise their power over KPMG via
the cooperation clauses in the deferred prosecution agreement to force KPMG to advance
the legal fees to the defendants. 27 1 KPMG, likewise, could take the initiative to remedy
the situation by realizing that any efforts by the firm to stymie the advancement of fees
to former employees could have a drastic chilling effect on their future "interest in
recruiting and retaining top flight personnel. ,,272
As creative as these ideas for

261. Olson et al., supran. 6, at 188.
262. Villa, supra n. 247, at § 5:8[E] (describing procedures set forth in Section 145(e) of the Delaware
General Corporation Law). "An undertaking is not required for employees and agents, or former directors and
officers." Olson et al., supra n. 6, at 188.
263. Ladig, supra n. 260.
264. Id.
265. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 373 (quoting U.S. v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365 (1980)).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 380.
268. Id. at 374.
269. Id.
270. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 380 n. 240.
271. Id. at 380.
272. Id.
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remedying the situation were, through the benefit of hindsight, it is now possible to
declare these approaches impotent given the current reality of the situation.2 73 In a show
of defiance, both KPMG and the government have since appealed the Stein ruling and
KPMG has been anything but responsive to further attempts by the defendants to obtain
2 74
legal fees.
Judge Kaplan also articulated an alternate remedy for the defendants in Stein
known simply as a "summary advancement proceeding," which is the target of this
to
casenote's primary analysis. 275 The significance of this particular remedy is attributed276
law.
partnership
and
law
corporate
Delaware
both
of
application
resourceful
Kaplan's
KPMG is a limited liability partnership organized under the laws of Delaware and
The
subject to the Delaware Revised Uniform Partnership Act (DRUPA). 277
indemnification provision in the DRUPA is permissive and provides that "a partnership
may, and shall have the power to, indemnify and hold harmless any partner or other
person from and against any and all claims and demands whatsoever.' '278 Under the
statute, partnerships can condition indemnification on "such standards and restrictions"
as it deems necessary to "set forth in its partnership agreement." 279 The advancement of
legal fees is not expressly provided for in the DRUPA, however, Delaware courts have
prior to final judgment"
granted partnerships the "authority to advance defense costs
280
given the broad construction of the indemnification statute.
While the authority to advance legal fees has been extended to Delaware
partnerships through case law, the right to a summary advancement proceeding pursuant
to Delaware corporate law has never been expressly extended to a limited liability
partnership. 2 8 1 This represents the ingenuity inherent in Judge Kaplan's remedy
formulated for the defendants in Stein.2 82 Kaplan points to Delaware corporate law to
afford the defendants the right to a summary advancement proceeding even though
KPMG is a limited liability partnership governed by the DRUPA and not the Delaware
General Corporation Law (DGCL). 2 83 Section 145 of the DGCL vests the Delaware
Court of Chancery with "exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all actions for

273. See Lynnley Browning, KPMG Strikes Back at Former Employees in Tax Shelter Case, N.Y. Times C4

(Sept. 19, 2006).
274. Id In response to a civil action filed by the defendants to recover legal expenses, KPMG
counterclaimed by alleging breaches of fiduciary duty, embezzlement, civil theft, and conversion against
several of the former employees. See Answer, Affirmative Defs., and Counterclaims of Def. KPMG LLP to
1-44, Stein et al. v. KPMG LLP, 2006 WL 2922084 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2006).
Civ. Compl. at
275. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 379-80.

276.
277.
278.
279.

Id.
Id. at 355 n. 117; Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 106.
Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 15-110.
Id.

280. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 355 (citing Senior Tour Players 207 Mgmt. Co. LLC v. Golftown 207 Holding
Co. LLC, 853 A.2d 124, 126 (Del. Ch. 2004); Delphi Easter PartnersLP v. SpectacularPartners,Inc., 1993
WL 328079 (Del. Ch. Aug. 6, 1993)).

281. According to research conducted on Westlaw as of November 27, 2006, no case involving a Delaware
partnership has been expressly associated with a summary advancement proceeding granted pursuant to
Delaware corporate law. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 145(k).
282. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 379-80.

283. Id. at 379 n. 237.
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advancement of expenses or indemnification brought under this section.' 284 The section
further states that the court "may summarily determine a corporation's obligation to
28 5
advance expenses (including attorney's fees).",
The general benefit of a summary advancement proceeding is its expediency and
constricted scope which allows parties who are financially dependent on their employer
for the payment of legal fees a quick resolution of the advancement dispute. 286 The
purpose of a summary advancement proceeding under Section 145(k) of the DGCL is
restricted to "determining 'the issue of entitlement according to the corporation's
advancement provisions and not to issues regarding the movant's alleged conduct in the
underlying litigation.' 287 The proceeding is not designed to determine a movant's
ultimate right to indemnification, since a party is not entitled to indemnification until
they have been "successful on the merits or otherwise" 288 in the defense of their
respective litigation. 2 89 Instead, the only goal of the proceeding is to determine whether
an individual has a right to the advancement of legal fees, which does not require a
successful outcome on the merits of the case. 29 Given the wealth of benefits a summary
advancement proceeding offers, it is clear why Judge Kaplan constructed such a remedy
for the defendants in Stein who are involved in such a massively complex and expensive
criminal trial. 29 1 The prompt resolution of the legal fee dispute between KPMG and its
former employees should be justly served under a summary advancement proceeding.
An issue not as clear, however, is why Delaware partnership law does not share
similar provisions governing the indemnification and advancement of legal fees as
Delaware corporate law.292 While this is by no means an accurate reflection of the
substance of the respective sections, it is alarming that Section 145 of the DGCL consists
of eleven subsections while Section 15-110 of the DRUPA has but one section consisting
of one sentence. 293 Why is it necessary to have indemnification and advancement
provisions so overtly contrasting simply because they address a different form of
business entity? If indemnification and advancement of legal fees truly are "principles of
American law" 294 as Judge Kaplan so passionately contends, then why do states such as
Delaware provide for these "principles" in separate statutes according to business form?
Due to the strong public policy support in favor of the indemnification and advancement
of legal fees, 295 states should provide one piece of legislation pertaining to the concepts
and apply it to all business entities regardless of form. This would ensure the consistent
and fair application of indemnification and advancement principles in all future conflicts

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 145(k) (emphasis added).
Id.
See Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 379-80; Kaung v. Cole Natl. Corp., 884 A.2d 500, 509 (Del. 2005).
Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 379 n. 237 (quoting Kaung, 884 A.2d at 509; Homestore, 886 A.2d at 213).
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 145(c).
Kaung, 884 A.2d at 509-10.
Id.
See Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 362.
CompareDel. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 15-110 with Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 145.
Id.
Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 335.
See Ladig, supran. 260.
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296

V.

CONCLUSION

Judge Kaplan's opinion in Stein stands poised to have a tremendous impact on the
future landscape of corporate criminal prosecution, and on the continued support of the
"principles" of indemnification and advancement of legal fees. 297 While the opinion's
persuasive authority is presently restricted to the Southern District of New York, the
court is an "important venue for corporate and white-collar prosecutions, and its
298
The ruling should promote
pronouncements always have been highly influential."
application by frontits
"strong-arm
and
Memo
Thompson
the
to
challenges
additional
' '2 99
Memo has
Thompson
of
the
Stein's attack on the constitutionality
line prosecutors.
already influenced further assaults on the government guidelines. For example, on
September 12, 2006, the Senate Judiciary Committee conducted a hearing targeting the
controversial guidelines and its effects on both corporations and employees under
investigation. 300 In response to federal prosecution tactics, both the chairman of the
committee and its ranking minority member claimed that the "practices were coercive
30 1
Although it
and called on [the Deputy Attorney General] to have them modified."
the postgets
that
"push"
be
the
to
remains to be seen, the Stein opinion could prove
30 2
As U.S. Treasury
Enron "regulatory pendulum [moving] in the opposite direction."
Secretary Henry M. Paulson recently stated, "Often the pendulum swings too far and we
3
need to go through a period of readjustment." 3° For the benefit of corporate America
and its employees, maybe that time has arrived.
Trent 0. Bridges*
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